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 1 
DEFINING OUR TERMS CAREFULLY AND IN CONTEXT: THOUGHTS ON READING (AND IN ONE CASE, 
REREADING) THREE BOOKS 
CYNTHIA CRAWFORD LICHTENSTEIN* 
 
 On January 11, 2012, John Kay, a Financial Times journalist, and Vikram Pandit, the CEO of 
Citigroup, contributed short think pieces under a single heading to the newspaper’s series on capitalism in 
crisis.
1
 Kay’s article ended with a paragraph stating that “[s]loppy language leads to sloppy thinking. By 
continuing to use the 19th-century term capitalism for an economic system that has evolved into 
something altogether different, we are liable to misunderstand the sources of strength of the market 
economy and the role capital plays within it.”2 This paper proceeds from the proposition that any rigorous 
discussion of the need for reform and/or more or less regulation of the mostly private
3
 institutions that 
carry out financial transactions requires that we state clearly what we mean by the terms “bank,” “shadow 
bank” and “the shadow banking system.” In addition, determining what counts as an appropriate 
definition will depend, in part, on a consideration of the person using the term or terms: Is she trained in 
legal analysis, in the discipline of economics or in the discipline of economic history? Or is she a 
financial journalist? Each of these types of commentators may use the terms “bank” and “shadow bank” 
intending different implications, depending upon the lens she is using for her analysis and her intellectual 
formation. The usage may not be “sloppy,”4 in John Kay’s words, but rather result from the fact that 




In preparing to write this paper, I read again
6
 Walter Bagehot’s Lombard Street: A Description of 
the Money Market ,
7
 Perry Mehrling’s The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last 
Resort
8
 and John Authers’ The Fearful Rise of Markets: Global Bubbles, Synchronized Meltdowns, and 
How to Prevent Them in the Future.
9
 I also read two pieces by Saule T. Omarova, Assistant Professor of 
Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law, to compare my own lens as a 
                                                 
* Professor Emeritus, Boston College Law School. 
1 John Kay & Vikrim Pandit, Capitalism is the Wrong Target – But We Can Refine It, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 11, 2012, 
at 9. 
2 Id.  
3 Here, immediately, is another opportunity for misunderstanding. Does the use of the word “private” signify a 
corporate entity majority-owned by members of the public as opposed to partial or full ownership by a state? Or does it mean 
simply a corporate entity whose shares are not issued to the public, however the securities laws of the entity’s jurisdiction define 
the term “public issue?” When I use the term “private” in this paper, I mean only that the entity is not a parastatal, as are some 
public utilities in the U.S. and as are most public utilities, railroads and communications companies abroad.  
4 Kay & Pandit, supra note 1. 
5 This discussion excludes how a politician seeking office may choose to use these words, or indeed, choose to 
misrepresent the functions of central banks. Whatever academicians, including academic economists and law professors, may 
advocate, the political realities on both the domestic and the international stages may make the most worthy schemes, well, 
“academic.”  
6 I first read Bagehot while obtaining a Master’s of Comparative Law in 1961-1963 at the University of Chicago Law 
School. As a female child of my time (born in 1934, in college from 1951-1955, and attending law school from 1956-1959), it 
had never occurred to me to study either economics or finance in college or corporate law at law school until my time as a 
summer associate at a Wall Street law firm with a major money center bank as one of its clients. The experience made me realize 
that the practice of banking and corporate law might interest me far more than the socially intractable problems of juvenile 
delinquents. As a result, I left the firm, which had hired me as a full time associate, after two years to study on a funded 
comparative law program during which I took economics courses at the Chicago School of Business. In one marvelous course in 
economic intellectual history, I read not only Bagehot, but a number of Keynes’ shorter tracts. I have been reading economists—
those who keep their equations to their footnotes—ever since.  
7 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET (1979). 
8 PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2011). 
9 JOHN AUTHERS, THE FEARFUL RISE OF MARKETS: GLOBAL BUBBLES, SYNCHRONIZED MELTDOWNS, AND HOW TO 
PREVENT THEM IN THE FUTURE (2010). 
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legally trained writer to that of another.
10
 Bagehot, of course, was the Governor of the Bank of England 
when he wrote what Mehrling calls his “magisterial” treatise in 1873 on how a central bank must react to 
a financial crisis.
11
 Mehrling is an economist and an economic historian. Authers is a financial journalist.  
I begin this piece with the legal perspective on the definition of “bank” and follow with an 
analysis of Bagehot, Mehrling and Authers. As I explain, this analysis should have consequences for 
crisis prevention and crisis mitigation: I suggest that attempting to analyze the recent financial crisis
12
 in 
terms of the legal description of the various economic actors in the financial sector (“banks” as opposed 
to “shadow banks,” for example) is not very helpful. Instead, the key issues for crisis prevention and 
mitigation is understanding (1) how credit intermediation works; (2) how in any particular period, that 
credit intermediation is accomplished; and, above all, (3) the effects of fear (also called “loss of 
confidence”) on that process. 
 
I. Defining the Terms “Banks” and “Shadow Banks” 
 
a. Defining “Banks”: The Law’s Definition 
Although one would never know it from reading financial journalism since the enactment of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the “GLBA”),13 the law clearly defines the term “bank.” The Banking Act of 
1933,
14
 which Congress enacted in reaction to the crash of 1929 and the Great Depression, clearly defines 
the word “bank” as an institution that takes “deposits” and is regulated by and examined by either a state 
or federal banking authority. After the 1999 passage of the GLBA, which repealed enough of the Banking 
Act of 1933 to permit the combination of insurance, investment banking and commercial banking in one  
financial holding company,
15
 the press routinely began to call pure investment banks, i.e., “ broker-
dealers” regulated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 like Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers, “banks.”16 Neither of those investment banks, however, had access to the Federal Reserve 
Bank’s (“Fed”) discount window, nor were they regulated by Fed at the time of their failure.17 In fact—
again, hardly recognized by discussion in either the press or academic papers—the GLBA never fully 
                                                 
10 Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1041 (2009); Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call A Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding 
Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113 (2011). 
11 MEHRLING, supra note 8, at 1. 
12 A plethora of books, articles and even a special issue of the Journal of International Economic Law analyze the 
crisis. For one such analysis, see The Quest for International Law in Financial Regulation and Monetary Affairs, 13 J. INT’L 
ECON. LAW 527 (2010) (compiling a series of articles in response to the financial crisis). All of the articles in this issue of the 
Journal of International Economic Law are by authors with legal training. For a recent paper by an economist, see Andrew W. 
Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A 21-Book Review (Jan. 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.argentumlux.org/documents/JEL_6.pdf). (reviewing twenty-one books on the financial crisis, eleven written by 
academics trained in the disciplines of economics or finance, ten written by journalists, and one written by a former Treasury 
Secretary). As Lo states in his abstract, “[n]o single narrative emerges from this broad and often contradictory collection of 
interpretations, but the sheer variety of conclusions is informative . . . .” Id. at 1. In their introduction to The Quest for 
International Law in Financial Regulation and Monetary Affairs, the co-editors agree that “[T]he causes of the crisis remain 
controversial and manifold . . . .” Thomas Cottier & Rosa M. Lastra, Introduction, 13 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 527, 527 (2010). 
13 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.  
14 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162. 
15 See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 
1341 (“Section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933 . . . (commonly referred to as the ‘Glass-Steagall Act’) is repealed.”); see also, 
e.g., Banking Act of 1933 § 20 (barring certain affiliations between investment banks and commercial banks). 
16 See Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Lessons for 21st-Century Central Bankers: Differences Between Investment and 
Depositary Banking, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: THE GLOBAL CRISIS 217, 218 (Mario Giovanoli & 
Diego Devos eds., 2010) [hereinafter Differences Between Investment and Depositary Banking] (“Since the USA repealed the 
remnants of its 1933 Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, both depositary institutions and securities firms have been uniformly lumped 
together by the media and many commentators under the term ‘banks.’”). 
17 Id. at 227. 
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repealed the Banking Act of 1933. It is remains illegal—that is, subject to criminal penalties—for an 
entity to take “deposits”18 without being regulated and examined by a state or federal banking authority: 
 
[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [f]or any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, 
or other similar organization to engage . . . in the business of receiving deposits subject to 
check . . .  unless such person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other 
similar organization . . . shall be . . . subjected, by the laws of the United States, or of the 
State, Territory, or District wherein located, to examination and regulation.”19   
 
Thus, we can call a “bank” any entity that takes “deposits” without violating this statute or an entity that 
is both regulated and examined
20
 by a state or federal banking authority.
 
 
Understanding the term “banking authority” with specificity is important because securities 
regulation originated as a form of consumer protection and, at least in the beginning, did not concern 
itself explicitly with safety and soundness.
21
 The term refers specifically to a federal or state authority that 
regulates entities chartered under special legislation for the incorporation of “banks,” as distinguished 
from broker-dealers regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under Federal law 
and under state securities law.
22
 During the crisis of 2007-2008, the culture and funding sources of the 
SEC and the federal banking authorities remained distinct.
23
 At the time of passage of the GLBA, 
Congress believed in “functional” regulation; that is, if you are a securities firm, you are regulated and    
examined by the SEC, and if you are a “bank,” you are regulated by the federal banking authorities.24 The 
GLBA maintained this “functional” division, even though the GLBA amended the Banking of Act of 
1933’s prohibition on affiliation between securities firms and “banks.”25 Thus, when Bear Stearns began 
to fail, Fed did not have any information concerning the financial state of the firm in its files until Bear 
Stearns’ president called in the Fed’s examiners with the purpose of asking for federal support; as a 
securities firm, formally, it was a “shadow bank” operating without the access to Fed’s financial support 
                                                 
18 The public likely does not recognize the difference between a checking, or “transaction”, account in a regulated 
depositary institution and a mutual fund or money market fund, regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Money market funds and mutual funds allow the owner of shares to draw checks 
against the fund. See AUTHERS, supra note 9, at 26 (explaining that “clients [of money market funds] could treat money market 
funds exactly like bank accounts, pulling out money instantly.”). This suggests their functional equivalence. However, since the 
criminal sanctions prescribed under 12 U.S.C. § 378(b) (2006) for the taking of “deposits” (which arguably could include the 
solicitation of investments in a SEC-regulated money market fund), are under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department, the 
Federal Reserve (“Fed”) never acted to restrain and regulate the money market funds when they first began. See generally 
AUTHERS, supra note 9, at ch. 4 (summarizing the history of money market funds in the United States).  
19 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (2006). 
20 For a description of the difference between “regulation” and “examination,” see Lichtenstein, supra note 16, at 224-
26 (distinguishing regulation from supervision by explaining that that the former punishes violations ex post, while the latter 
takes an ex ante oversight role). 
21 Id. at 228. 
22 Id. at 223. Eventually, of course, the SEC instituted net capital rules for the broker-dealers supervised by it. See 
generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2012). Congress also enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-598, § 
3(a), 84 Stat. 1636, 1637 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(1) (2006)), which established the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC). 
23 See Lichtenstein, supra note 16, at 227 (“[The SEC’s] entire culture has been consumer protection . . . .”). 
24 Id. at 227 (“Congress, convinced of a notion of ‘functional regulation’ . . . not only allowed the [large complex 
banking organizations] to have full-scale securities subsidiaries for the first time . . . but also made the SEC the primary regulator 
of these subsidiaries.”). This may all change with the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter “Dodd-Frank Act”], which was passed in reaction to the 
crisis. 
25 Lichtenstein, supra note 16, at 227. 
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extended to federally insured “banks.”26 This anecdote illustrates a consequence of falling outside the  
legal definition of a bank.  
Being an entity that falls within the definition in 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2)
27
 also leads to a number of  
consequences. First, because the GLBA did not fully repeal the Banking Act of 1933, entities that are 
chartered as “banks” as well as any entities that comply with 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2)28 may not engage in 
any form of the securities business other than such business permissible to national banks.
29
 The GLBA 
repealed the sections of the Act that forbade affiliation between securities businesses and depositary 
institutions. The significant term here is “securities business.” The Banking Act of 1933’s original 
prohibitions were intended to keep “member banks” from either acting as broker-dealers or affiliating 
with broker-dealers.
30
 National banks and, by extension, member banks were and are permitted, however, 
to own certain “eligible securities.”31 This detail of the law became highly significant when member 
“banks” began receiving regulatory permission from the bank holding company regulator, the Fed,  to 
enter—through a bank holding company subsidiary—into a limited securities business.32 The significance 
of this special permission for “banks” to own—and, implicitly, to borrow against these holdings as 
collateral, i.e., to “repo”—will become clear when I discuss Mehrling. Under the GLBA, though, in order 
for a financial company both to take deposits in its “bank” subsidiary with access to the so-called federal 
“safety net” and to engage in investment banking in another subsidiary, the entity must form a financial 
holding company.
33
 The financial holding company can then simultaneously hold one or more “banks” in 
addition to subsidiaries with other functions. The non-bank subsidiaries may engage in any securities 
business in addition to those specially excepted categories of securities business that have always been 
statutorily permitted to national banks.
34
  
Thus, the landscape changed from the original complete separation of investment banking and 
commercial banking under the Banking Act of 1933 to a system allowing the combination of the two as 
                                                 
26 Id. at 228 n.34 (“[T]he CEO of Bear Stearns, knowing that his firm was about to go under, called Fed’s examiners in 
to see what was the firm’s financial situation a few days before Fed made the arrangements (with considerable public backing) to 
have the firm sold to JP Morgan Chase. The SEC as Bear’s supervisor did not have the information.”). 
27 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
28 Id. 
29 See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (2006) (making it unlawful “[f]or any person, firm, corporation, association, business 
trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, 
or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent 
whatever in the business of receiving deposits . . . ”). 
“The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national banking] association  shall be limited to purchasing 
and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for 
its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock . . . .”).  
30 All national banks are required to be both insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, id. § 1814, and 
members of the Federal Reserve System, id. § 222. 
31 National banks were and are permitted to own both Treasuries and certain highly rated corporate securities as 
designated in a regulation of the Comptroller of the Currency. See 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(a), (c) (2012) (permitting national banks to 
invest in, respectively, treasury obligations and investment grade securities). Likewise, member banks may own these securities 
because the Federal Reserve Act permitted state chartered banks to enter into the system and placed upon them the same 
restrictions limiting their securities holdings as were and are applicable to national banks. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-
43, § 9, 38 Stat. 251, 259 (1913). 
32 Congress later repealed the prohibition on affiliation with broker-dealers in the GLBA. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999). 
33 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (allowing bank holding companies that qualify as financial holding companies to engage 
in activities that are “financial in nature”). 
34 See id. § 1843(k)(4)(A) (listing “lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding money or 
securities” as activities that are “financial in nature” and thus permissible for financial holding companies). As is always true in 
U.S. banking regulation, which is a truly deformed structure largely for historical reasons, this issue of what types of securities 
business may be done by “banks” without violating the Glass-Steagall Act prohibition is a highly technical matter. After the 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the large financial conglomerates moved their securities business (at that time, handling 
“eligible securities”) out of their subsidiary banks and into their broker-dealer subsidiaries, probably due to the differing capital 
requirements for “banks” and for broker-dealers. For a discussion touching on these lawyerly technicalities, see Lichtenstein, 
supra note 16, at 220-21; supra text accompanying note 29. For a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s gradual expansion of the 
permissible securities activities for nonbank subsidiaries, see Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 10 (manuscript at 5-15). 
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long as the investment banking business was run out of subsidiaries of a financial holding company. With 
the most recent adjustment of the GLBA to allow both types of  financial business in a single entity
35—
the “Volcker Rule,”36 which prohibits certain investment banking subsidiaries from operating a 
“proprietary trading” desk—the regulatory posture in the United States looks quite similar to that into 
which the United Kingdom is moving with its Vickers Report.
37
 This parallel movement contradicts the 
laudatory view some commentators took toward Europe’s “universal bank” system of financial 
intermediaries in which depositary institutions could freely conduct securities business as well as 
insurance within the same entity during the run-up to the enactment of GLBA.
38
 Because the United 
States has not as yet completed the reforms mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act and the United Kingdom 
has not yet completed those recommended by the Vickers Report, it remains uncertain whether permitting 
the combination of securities business and commercial banking in a regulated financial holding company 
will prevent prevent future financial crises on the scale of that experienced in 2008.
39
  
The regulation of “banking” through the supervision of financial conglomerates that hold both 
deposit-taking entities and other financial entities is not new to the U.S. regulatory system, however, and 
demonstrates the dominance of the idea of deposit taking as a central function of a “bank.” As first 
enacted in 1956, the Bank Holding Company Act (the “BHCA”)40 required that holding companies hold 
control of two or more “banks.”41 It is not necessary here to go into a history of the changing definitions 
of the word “bank” throughout the period that the BHCA has been in effect:  Saule Omarova and 
Margaret E. Tahyar effectively trace this change from the legal perspective in That Which We Call A 




 Omarova and 
Tahyar’s piece, while attending carefully and effectively to the legal point of view, has a defect from the 
perspective of the authors of the books discussed in this piece. The references throughout Omarova and 
Tahyar to Fed suggest that they consider Fed as one more regulatory agency that “desire[s] to protect its 
administrative turf and further consolidate its own power,” and seeks to “preserve its 
independence . . . .”43 Though such claims are endemic in the economic literature, Omarova and Tahyar 
overlook Fed’s function as the United States’ central bank. Specifically, their history of the BHCA does 
not account for the fact that Fed, as the central bank ultimately responsible for the United States’ financial 
and monetary stability, desires to oversee the intermediaries that transmit its policy decisions through the 
                                                 
35 See generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
36 Id. § 619 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)); see also Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,322 (proposed Feb. 14, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 75) (proposing rules to implement the Volcker Rule). For an interesting defense of this rule, see Paul 
Volcker, Foreign Critics Should Not Worry About My Rule, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at 9.  
37 See INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 10-11 (2011) (suggesting that authorities “ring-
fence” banks “to isolate those banking activities where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a bank’s 
customers”). 
38 See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated Supervision of Financial Conglomerates: 
Controlling Systemic Risk, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 137, 142 [hereinafter Controlling Systemic Risk] (“Universal banking in the 
sense of the combination of investment banking, insurance, and commercial banking is an existing part of the global financial 
system.”). 
39 This statement assumes, of course, that very large, lightly regulated financial conglomerates were at the heart of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. Others argue that the mortgage lending agencies Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae, as well as the housing 
policy imposed on those agencies, were the primary causes of the crisis. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 472 (2011) (Wallison, dissenting) (arguing that various mortgage servicing entities, including Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, were “compelled to compete for mortgage borrowers who were at or below the median income,” causing 
underwriting standards to decline, increasing the number of risky loans and contributing to the housing bubble). Furthermore, in a 
seminal piece on the crisis, Rosa Lastra and Geoffrey Wood adopt the argument that the combination of securities firms and 
commercial banking was not a contributing cause of the Great Depression, citing economists who in the 1990s supported the 
legislation that eventually became the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Rosa M. Lastra & Geoffrey Wood, The Crisis of 2007-09: 
Nature, Causes, and Reactions, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 531, 535 (2010). 
40 Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) [hereinafter BHCA]. 
41 Id. § 2(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841). 
42 Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 10 (manuscript at 22-38). 




 Of course, whether or not the central bank of a nation should also have regulatory authority 
over a nation’s “banks” is a hotly debated question in the literature. Omarova and Tahyar draw the 
important conclusion that legislative definitions create regulatory arbitrage opportunities.
45
 Nonetheless, 
they recommend solving this little difficulty with legislative definitions that “adopt[] a dynamic view of 
regulatory reform, which aims to anticipate potential market responses to legislative action and to build 
adjustment mechanisms into the regulatory regime.”46 This solution seemingly considers a central bank’s 
possible regulatory role without taking into account the central bank’s role as a sovereign’s monetary 
authority and the connection between that role and regulation of the transmitters of the monetary policy 
adopted by the authority.  However, it is very hard to find in the macroeconomic literature much 
understanding of the legal detail of regulation. 
Commentators, both contemporary and historical, have critiqued regulators’ ability to prevent 
economic crises, citing misunderstandings about how markets function. George Soros, the man who made 
his first millions by betting against the British pound and the French franc when the then-European 
Economic Community was attempting to keep the currencies of its members valued within a band, 
warned that:  
 
[T]he European authorities [trying to deal with the Greek crisis] had little understanding 
of how financial markets really work. Far from combining all the available knowledge in 
the market’s movements, as economic theory claims, financial markets are ruled by 
impressions and emotions and they abhor uncertainty. To bring a financial crisis under 




This quotation echoes almost exactly Bagehot, whose book I discuss. Thus, however “flexible” legislative 
or regulatory “action” attempts to be, it likely will not be sufficient to prevent—or cure—financial crises 
without consideration of the central bank’s “lender (or dealer as Mehrling would have it) of last resort” 
function. 
 
b. Defining “Shadow Banks”: The Economist’s Definition 
Having dealt with the U.S. definition of a bank as a legal matter, I turn now to what might be a 
legal perspective on “shadow banks” or “the shadow banking system.” Unlike banks, legislators have not 
defined these terms in law and, thus, there is no legal definition of the terms. Instead, economists coined 
the term “shadow banking,” specifically Gary Gorton in his writings about the 2007-2009 Crisis.48 
Subsequently citing Gorton, Professors Rosa M. Lastra and Geoffrey Wood consider various causes of 
the crisis in The Crisis of 2007-09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions.
49
 In their discussion of the role played 
by “derivatives markets, unregulated firms, lightly regulated firms, and the shadow banking system,”50 
                                                 
44 Significantly, in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty, the Fed’s statutory independence has been replicated in the 
legislation of all members of the European Union. 
45 Id. (manuscript at 68) (“As this Article demonstrates, every cycle of restrictive legislation also created unforeseen 
opportunities for private industry actors to avoid the BHCA’s restrictions, often by exploiting definitional technicalities.”). 
46 Id. (manuscript at 69).  
47 George Soros, How to Save the Euro, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2012, at 17-18. 
48 Lastra & Wood, supra note 39, at 532 n.2 (“Gary Gorton believes that it was the [wholesale] run on the sale-and-
repurchase market (the repo market) during 2008, a bank run not so much on depository institution [sic], but on the shadow 
banking system, which caused the crisis.”). In Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15223, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440752, the authors argue that the 2007–2009 crisis was caused by turmoil 
in the repo market, a “short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial 
institutions.” Id. at 1. Repo transactions often use collateral in the form of securitized bonds. Id. Gorton and Metrick argue that 
the combination of securitization and repo finance drove the crisis. Id. Specifically, “[c]oncerns about the liquidity of markets for 
the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo “haircuts” . . . . With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the U.S. 
banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.” Id.  
49 Lastra & Wood, supra note 39. 
50 Id. at 540. 
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Lastra and Wood describe the work of economists Nouriel Roubini and Gorton, but, refraining from 
drawing any conclusions, simply remark that studying history can help to make the “shadow banking 
system less vulnerable to panic.”51 According to Lastra and Wood, “[t]he expression ‘shadow banking 
system’ is imprecise and its contours are not clearly defined.”52  
Omarova and Tahyar state that the Dodd-Frank Act “effectively expands the BHCA model of 
regulation and supervision, with some modifications, to all financial institutions designated as 
‘systemically important’ and thus subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve.” 53 
“Systemically important” financial institutions,54 however, are not the same as “shadow banks.” 
Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act does not define the term “shadow banking system.” Indeed, the 
legislation affects “shadow banks” only peripherally, although the Act imposes regulation on a number of  
entities engaged in the financial markets that previously were not subject to regulation at all.  
I discuss herein three books to address what “shadow banks” and “the shadow banking system” 
might mean. I intend to show why the shadow banking system—as it is thought of by Roubini and 
Gorton—matters. I will also explain how it fits into Bagehot’s concept of the lender of last resort, and, 
thus, why Mehrling entitled his book, “The New Lombard Street.”  
 
II. Bagehot, Authers and Mehrling 
The three books I will discuss were not written  by authors with legal training. Indeed, the first 
book was written by the Governor of the Bank of England, the second by a financial journalist, and the 
last by an economist and economic historian with a special interest in the history of central banking  
Our first author, Bagehot, chose to subtitle his 1873 book “A Description of the Money 
Market.”55 Although Bagehot argued that it should be possible to avoid the banking system’s collapse, 
Bagehot refers not to institutions, but instead to the money market. Bagehot does not suggest that it is 
possible to prevent panics. In fact, he never even suggests the causes of panics. A practical man, he seems 
to share George Soros’s view that “financial markets are ruled by impressions and emotions and they 
abhor uncertainty.”56  
Significantly, Bagehot begins the book with a simple description of leverage.
57
 Bagehot explains 
England’s position as “the greatest moneyed country in the world” as a result of the “ready balance—the 
floating loan-fund which can be lent to anyone for any purpose . . . .”58 Accordingly, lending enriches 
                                                 
51 Lastra and Wood write:  
 
According to Roubini, broker-dealers, hedge funds, private equity groups, structured investment vehicles and 
conduits, money market funds, and nonbank mortgage lenders are all part of this shadow system. Other 
commentators relate the shadow banking system to the growth of the securitization of assets. Gary Gorton 
and others believe that it was the (wholesale) run on the repo market during 2008—the bank run not so much 
on depository institutions as on the shadow banking system—that caused the crisis. Gorton explains that, 
while in the past depositors ran to their banks and demanded cash in exchange for their checking accounts, 
the 2008 panic involved financial firms ‘running’ on other financial firms by not renewing repo agreements 
or increasing the repo margin, thus forcing sudden deleveraging and leading to many banking insolvencies. 
Earlier banking crises have many features in common with the current crisis. History can help understand the 
current situation and guide thoughts about regulatory reform, by making the shadow banking system less 
vulnerable to panic. 
 
Id. at 541 (citations omitted). 
52 Id. at 540. 
53 Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 10 (manuscript at 13). 
54 In an article of this length, it is not possible to address the meaning—or meanings, as different commentators assign 
different connotations to the term—of “systemically important,” or even to review how the Dodd-Frank Act uses the term.  
55 See generally BAGEHOT, supra note 7. 
56 Soros, supra note 47. 
57 Given its elegance, I believe Bagehot’s definition of leverage should be read in every law school course on corporate 
finance. 
58 BAGEHOT, supra note 7, at 4. 
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business because “English trade is carried on upon borrowed capital to an extent of which few foreigners 
have an idea, and none of our ancestors could have conceived.”59 Bagehot explains how “[i]n every 
district small traders have arisen, who ‘discount their bills’ largely, and with the capital so borrowed, 
harass and press upon, if they do not eradicate, the old capitalist.”60 This “old capitalist” uses exclusively 
his own funds in lieu of borrowed capital. Bagehot’s small trader can profit by using only $10,000 and 
borrowing $40,000, enabling him to sell his goods cheaper.
61
 Bagehot emphasizes that “[i]n modern 
English business, owing to the certainty of obtaining loans on discount of bills or otherwise at a moderate 
rate of interest, there is a steady bounty on trading with borrowed capital, and a constant discouragement 
to confine yourself solely or mainly to your own capital.”62 
This is all well and good, but from where, exactly, is Bagehot’s small trader to borrow money? 
Where else but “the money market”: Bagehot’s money market is the market provided by banks and 
acceptance houses in London where bills of exchange could be discounted. Its participants include those 
brokers and banks that will accept, at a discount, the bills of exchange that the small trader receives for 
the sale of his goods in lieu of cash. A “bill of exchange” and an “acceptance” are the foundation of credit 
in the commercial world, since they facilitate the movement of goods. According to Mehrling in his 
history of the Federal Reserve and its discount window, the modern “real bills” doctrine grew out of 
Bagehot’s money market.63 
This system for obtaining commercial credit worked, and continues to work today, in what might 
be called the “retail” discount market. In the following description of the retail discount market, I assume 
that each bill was drawn to pay for specific goods that the small trader was selling. That is, behind each 
bill was a tangible good; there was no “speculation” on market movements and the amounts lent out were 
limited ultimately by the amounts of goods sold. Since the amount of debt depended on the value of 
goods, the market did not create “money” simply out of thin air.  
Suppose that a seller (“S”) sells, by agreement with a buyer (“B”), goods moving either in 
domestic trade—demonstrated by railroad or trucking shipping documents—or international trade —
verified by “Bills of Lading” that embody the goods shipped. S and B have a commercial bank (“CB”) 
open a letter of credit (“L/C”) in favor of S. When S ships the goods, S either, as per the L/C, draws a 
sight draft on CB or a time draft for acceptance by CB. S then presents the draft together with the 
shipping documents to one of the banks in the L/C chain. That bank either pays S for the sight draft which 
was negotiated to the bank or “accepts” S’s draft in accordance with the terms of the L/C, paying S by 
discounting the acceptance. In both cases, the bank credits S’s account as payment for the goods that S 
has shipped, and S can continue manufacturing more goods to put into the stream of commerce.  
In the meantime, the chain of banks that has financed the sale holds the commercial paper 
generated by the sale, and the shipping documents reifying the goods serve as collateral for the bank’s 
financing. Based on CB’s assessment of B’s creditworthiness, CB will have determined whether to 
require B to commit funds by debiting B’s account to pay out on the drafts and shipping documents. In 
any case, B will not get her hands on the goods until she has paid for them or CB decides to extend her 
working capital, thereby releasing the “security” in the form of the shipping documents. This is the 
process of “commercial” finance and explains why “commercial banks” were originally so labeled.  
In this way, commercial banks created money market instruments and financed commerce. In 
Bagehot’s London, those instruments then went to acceptance houses that provided liquidity to the money 
markets. In the United States, they were sent to the Federal Reserve Banks, who, within the scope of the 
Fed’s discount regulation, gave good funds at their discount windows to commercial banks that needed 
liquidity, discounting the instruments that had been created in the process of financing domestic and 
                                                 
59 Id. at 7-8. 
60 Id. at 4. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 8-9. 
63 See MEHRLING, supra note 8, at 18-19 (“Bagehot’s world was based on a short-term commercial credit instrument 
known as the bill of exchange. . . . It was in this institutional context that the Bank of England developed the principles of central 
bank management that laid the foundations for modern monetary theory.”). 
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international trade in goods. Subsequently, most of the nation’s banks stopped using the Fed’s discount 
window, and instead simply adjusted their liquidity needs in the private “federal funds market.”64 
As noted above, when the commercial bills discounting process creates commercial credit or bank 
funding, the amount of goods that enter into the stream of commerce limits the amount of such credit. 
Furthermore, if the initial lender must realize on the collateral, markets for tangible goods in the stream of 
trade, even markets with goods sold at “fire sales,” do not suffer enormous volatility unless the goods are 
“commodities” of the kind now traded as “alternative investments.”65 With the exception of Mehrling, an 
economic historian, I have not read a single author writing about this latest economic crisis, whether 
trained in legal analysis or the discipline of economics, who addresses the link between the quantity of 
goods in trade and the creation of trade credit. 
To illustrate the importance of this link, contrast this process with the financing process for the 
sale and trade of securities, commodity futures, mortgage obligations or what used to be called 
“conditional sale” paper. Securities are indeed bought and sold on credit. U.S. securities legislation 
recognizes this fact by allowing regulatory “margin” requirements, which may limit the amount that a 
purchaser of securities may borrow to finance the trade. Additionally, securities houses finance trades in 
the markets by pledging as collateral to their lenders the securities they have in inventory. The amount of 
credit that a bank is willing to lend to the particular house or hedge fund, however, limits the amounts that 
these entities can borrow.
66
 Furthermore, the value of the collateral, the securities pledged, may be highly 
volatile, depending on whether they are Treasury bills or market traded equities, and may be difficult to 
price, like collateralized debt obligations or private, not publicly-listed, equity. The contrast with 
Bagehot’s acceptances and sight drafts could not be more complete. These differences may explain why 
commercial banks were traditionally only permitted to own certain debt securities.  
When Bagehot was in Lombard Street writing about the “duty” of the Bank of England as a 
central bank to lend freely and at a high rate during a crisis,
67
 he meant that when the private markets 
froze up because of fears about the health of the pound, the British central bank should put its funds into 
the money markets by buying acceptances from the acceptance houses in London. Once again, at that 
time, the quantity of those acceptances was limited to the amount of actual goods moving in trade. As a 
young lawyer in the banking department of a Wall Street firm in the 1960’s, I spent considerable time 
figuring out if paper was “eligible” for discount under Fed’s regulations then in place. This paper was 
generated through the trade financing described above and not limited in the ways Bagehot’s was. Only if 
the paper was “eligible” under the applicable Fed regulation—which, at the time, limited eligibility to 
trade-generated paper having only six months to run—would it be acceptable to other banks or wholesale 
dealers in the money markets.  
When in the 1960s Citibank convinced its regulator, the Comptroller of the Currency, that 
Citibank should have the corporate power to create “acceptances” and sell them into the money market, 
these “acceptances” consisted solely of Citibank’s promise to pay. They did not grow out of Citi’s 
financing of domestic or international trade in goods. They were not backed by the movement of real 
                                                 
64 There is no time in a piece like this to either write in detail about the federal funds market or to give citations to the 
numerous books, including those issued by the Federal Reserve’s public relations department, that describe the market and its 
functions. Its workings are usually studied in undergraduate economics courses in “Money and Banking.” Unfortunately, few law 
schools teach anything about it. 
65 This is another story which cannot be told here.  While “commodities”, such as wheat or copper or cotton or whale 
oil (yes, whale oil – the old U.S. cases concerned speculation in the price of whale oil, and I, at least, imagine that  the “widows’ 
walks” on the top of houses on the New England shore were used not only for the wives of seamen but also for those who were 
interested in the large quantity of whale oil that would be added to the market by returning ships), are “goods” in the Uniform 
Commercial Code sense, see generally U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2010), their markets now are profoundly affected by the supervision 
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the mutual funds and hedge funds that invest in and trade in commodity 
futures. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2006) (defining the scope of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s supervision).  
66 The amount of credit that a bank could lend may also be limited by the SEC’s and Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission’s margin requirements. For a detailed description of the near-failure of Long Term Capital Management, at the time 
the largest hedge fund in terms of assets held in the United Staets, see AUTHERS, supra note 9, at ch. 12.  
67 BAGEHOT, supra note 7, at 187-89. 
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goods in international trade. These “naked” acceptances facilitated Citibank access to funding from the 
money markets. To this day, I wonder if the lawyers at the Office of the Controller of the Currency 
understood what they were doing when they declared that Citibank had the power to issue such paper.
68
  
Citibank’s participation in such activities ensured that other financial institutions would begin to 
follow course. Somewhat like Citibank in the 1960s, Northern Rock in the 2000s in the United Kingdom 
funded itself by selling mortgages without recourse to the bank should the obligor on the mortgage note 
default. Only the quantity of mortgage lending that it was willing to do limited Northern Rock’s access to 
funds, unless its regulator was to impose restrictions on the quantity and quality of its real estate lending. 
Thus, the now-infamous credit default obligations that were created out of bundles of mortgage 
obligations and sold by U.S. banks were yet another novel way those banks could fund themselves.  
Historically, of course, “banks” have funded themselves with deposits, short-term lending by the 
public to banks used to finance trade or provide working capital. Commercial banks undertook this 
function: the lending of bank deposits to fuel commerce. These commercial banks functioned as 
intermediaries, providing the public with a safe place to keep its deposits, particularly following the 
establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. At the same time, they provided enterprises 
with working capital, as opposed to capital generated by the issuance of stock or debt in the securities 
markets. Commercial banks were essentially the only “credit intermediaries,” which may explain why 
Congress in 1933 was willing to give them the public subsidy of deposit insurance.
69
 
Since U.S. law forbids securities firms to take deposits,
70
 broker-dealers traditionally have 
financed their securities trading much like any other business: either by borrowing from banks or other 
lenders, or by issuing stock or debt instruments. Bank holding companies and financial services holding 
companies also obtain capital by issuing shares and debt instruments to the public. 
             However, the historical public function of securities houses was very different. Such firms aided 
businesses in the distribution of securities to the public through their “underwriting” function. They also 
bought and sold securities to “make markets.” Securities houses were not long-term lenders and, thus, 
were not “intermediaries” at all. Instead, they functioned as capital market facilitators. Insurance 
companies and pensions, neither of whom borrowed short-term, performed the long-term lending function 
in the capital markets. While insurance companies are liable to pay out on their insurance obligations, just 
when they may be called to fulfill these obligations depends on the calculations of their actuaries.  
Equally, pension funds may predict their obligations with considerable certainty. Both businesses differ 
completely from depositary institutions with funding from demand deposits. Thus, in Bagehot’s time, 
only “banks” were subject to runs during a panic when, for whatever reason, market participants lost 
confidence in credit markets. Bagehot’s solution, of course, was to support the commercial credit market 
by lending freely at a penalty rate.
71
 
In Authers’s book, he explains how the work of “banks” and other financial entities72 in capital 
markets has been transformed over the years. The “fearful rise” of markets in Authers title describes a 
complete transformation of the capital markets of Bagehot’s time to the profoundly interconnected, 
liberalized capital markets we have today. Consistent with Bagehot and Soros, Authers attempts to: 
 
                                                 
68 Without the requirement that the acceptance must be of a bill of exchange evidencing an actual sale of goods in trade, 
and given that Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act—limiting a national bank’s borrowing authority—has been repealed, there 
is no limit on the amount of acceptances that a national bank can make. See generally Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 13, 38 Stat. 
251, 264 (1913), repealed by Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 402, 96 Stat. 1469, 
1510.    
69 When supplied, deposit insurance constitutes a subsidy because the institution that receives it is able to obtain 
funding for less than the market rate of interest. It is usually not understood that “deposits” are loans by the public to the 
depositary bank, with a checking account (or other “demand deposit”) being a truly short term loan and savings deposits being 
loans that come due upon their term, but rarely exceeding eighteen months at most. 
70 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
71 See BAGEHOT, supra note 7, at 187-89 (detailing what steps a central bank should take to stop a panic). 
72 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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explain how the world’s markets became synchronized [and] how they formed a 
bubble. . . . Investment bubbles inevitably recur from time to time because they are 
rooted in human psychology. Markets are driven by the interplay of greed and fear. When 





Taking a journalistic approach, Authors describes clearly why the International Monetary Fund has not 
been able to function as a true international lender of last resort to help alleviate the effects of the 
inevitable bursting of these “synchronized bubbles.” Authers also explains why uncoordinated central 
bank actions in sovereign nations can lead to problems such as the “carry trade.”74 Furthermore, Authers 
clearly describes how commercial banks were replaced in their intermediation function by creatures of the 
“shadow banking system,” such as money market mutual funds75 and hedge funds.76  
In Mehrling’s book, Mehrling analyzes the new forms of intermediation and compares how the 
new “intermediaries” fund themselves with the participants in the money market of Bagehot’s day.77  
Unlike Authers, a particularly knowledgeable financial journalist, Mehrling is an economist and, just as 
importantly, an economic historian. Accordingly, he places the transformation described by Authers in the 
historical context of changing views of the purpose of a U.S. central bank. According to Mehrling, 
Bagehot took a “money view” of the job of a central banker, whereas what he calls the “economics view” 
and later the “finance view” influence those presently in charge of Fed.78 Mehrling writes in detail about 
what he describes as the “plumbing behind the walls.”79 He describes today’s wholesale “money market,” 
wherein the securities firms that are “prime dealers” work with Fed to create the market in which 
Treasury securities are “repoed” to permit Fed to adjust the federal funds rate. Mehrling’s book helps one 
understand Gorton’s argument80 that a run on the wholesale repo market caused the financial crisis.81 
Mehrling writes about the inherent instability of credit and describes today’s markets for credit, which, 
unlike those in Bagehot’s time, are not acceptance markets, but markets for the short-term pledge of 
securities: the repo market. This market is where the new intermediaries, the “shadow banks,” get their 
funding, and it is this market that can suddenly, as it did with the fall of Lehman Brothers, seize up. 
Mehrling argues that Fed must address the failure of liquidity in this market with Bagehot-type 
intervention. Mehrling calls Fed's role with respect to this new market the "new Lombard Street" and the 
"dealer of last resort," but it could just as well be described as the last resort for the "shadow banking 
system."  
                                                 
73 AUTHERS, supra note 9, at 3. 
74 Id. at ch. 8. I have written in the past that the failure of the Basel Committee to understand how today’s financial 
markets really work caused them to make a careless mistake in creating the capital requirements for international banks in the 
first Basel Accord. See generally Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Jurisdiction over International Capital Flows and the 
Role of the IMF: Plus Ça Change . . . , in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 61 (Mario 
Giovanoli ed., 2000). 
75 See AUTHERS, supra note 9, at 25-31 (arguing that “[c]apital markets took over the core functions of banks . . . .”). 
76 See id. at 83-89 (telling the story of Long Term Capital Management and its rescue.). 
77 MEHRLING, supra note 8, at 5. 
78 See id. (“As a consequence of this long dominance of the economics and then finance views, modern policymakers 
have lost sight of the Fed’s historical mission to manage the balance between discipline and elasticity in the interbank payments 
system.”). We need not concern ourselves in this law review piece with these “views”, which probably concern economists in 
academia.  
79 Id. at 9.  
80 See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 48, at 1. 
81 I cannot pretend to fully understand this book, not being up to date in macroeconomics and Federal Reserve policy 
management, but I am fascinated by it. At the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy, which almost all commentators seem to agree was 
the trigger for the global meltdown of the capital markets, I realized that I needed to understand more about “prime dealers”. This 
book has permitted that. 
